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ccording to some observers, we are
living in "the age of apology." (For
example, see Mark Gibney, Rhoda E.
Howard-Hassmann, Jean-Marc Coicaud and
Niklaus Steiner, eds., The Age of Apology: Fa-
cing Up to the Past, University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2007). Apologies from individual politi-
cians are nothing new, but oﬃcial apologies
from governments to other states or to aggrie-
ved domestic groups are increasingly common.
Often, these actions are part of transitional ju-
stice. In certain circumstances, political leaders
18
choose to issue an oﬃcial apology in order to
come to terms with a problematic past, to heal
old wounds, to reunite estranged communities,
and to facilitate a better future for political vic-
tims, perpetrators, and the whole polity. These
apologies may oﬀer an attractive middle path
between the alternatives of mass amnesty and
criminal prosecution, and they may be part of
a broader process of political reconciliation.
Some political apologies are famous (e.g., the
U.S federal government's apology for interning
Japanese Americans in World War II, Pope
John Paul II's many apologies for various hi-
storical wrongs committed by the Catholic
Church, and Australia's apologies for mistreat -
ment of aboriginal peoples), but other political
apologies are less well known. And of course
they vary greatly in their motivation and eﬃ-
cacy. Information about hundreds of political
apologies can be found via an online database
[http://political-apologies.wlu.ca/], which was
established and is maintained by Rhoda E. Ho-
ward-Hassmann, Wilfrid Laurier University,
Canada.
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A List of Apologies World Wide
by Graham Dodds
A
bstract: This paper oﬀers a critique of
David Miller’s recent account of inhe-
rited national responsibility. It is ar-
gued that the account leads to a dilemma: either
it does not make sense to say that we can accept
the national inheritance, or, on a diﬀerent sense
of acceptance, it does, but then we encounter a
 serious conflict with one of our important intui-
tions about responsibility. 
Introduction
David Miller argues that it makes sense to
claim that nations can inherit responsibility.
Given certain circumstances, current members
of nation X can be said to have obligations to
pay compensation of the relevant kind to either
the victims or the descendants of victims of a
past injustice that was committed by previous
members of nation X. In this paper, I argue
that while this account works for two sets of
circumstances as distinguished by Miller, it
does not for a third – the situation where the
current members of nation X have not benefi-
ted from the injustice in question. My focus in
this paper is narrow, and consequently I take
many things as given. I accept the idea that na-
tions can be held collectively responsible, I
grant that it can be empirically possible to
identify the victims or descendants of victims
of past injustice and the eﬀects that this inju-
stice had on them. I try, in short, to agree with
Miller as much as possible, in order to disagree
with him more eﬀectively. In the first section
‘Miller’s Taxonomy: Three Types of Claims’ I
describe the three types of claims; the second
section ‘The First Two Claims Considered’
deals with Miller’s argument for the possible
validity (given the right empirical circumstan-
ces) of the first two types of claims; the third
section ‘A Critique of Miller’s Account in the
Third Type of Claim’ discusses problems which
arise for the third type of claim from the im-
possibility or excessive cost of rejecting one’s
national inheritance; the fourth section ‘The
Challenge of Cultural Cosmpolitanism?’ con-
siders the view of cultural cosmopolitanism
and it’s relevance to the question of inherited
responsibility, national or otherwise; and the
final section ‘Considering One Response to the
Critique of Miller’ outlines a problem which
arises for one plausible response to the pro-
blems outlined in the third section. 
Before beginning the critique of Miller’s ac-
count, however, it is necessary to deal with a
generic concern that always arises when dis-
cussing historical injustice: how far back
should we go? Several thousand years ago,
Aryan groups migrated to the Indian sub-con-
tinent. In the process of establishing their civi-
lization they indulged in the standard practice
of ‘oppressing the natives’. Can descendants of
those natives (the Dravidians) demand com-
pensation from descendants of those Aryans?
Could descendants of Adam, say, demand
compensation from the descendants of Eve for
her part in getting him to eat the apple?1 Or is
there some sort of limiting factor, some point
in time such that acts beyond this point cannot
be subject to claims of compensation?
This concern is discussed, for example and
amongst others, by Jeremy Waldron and
George Sher2. It will not, however, be discussed
in this paper. This is not to deny its impor-
tance. Miller, for instance, clearly recognises
that it is important, but avoids discussing it be-
cause it bears ‘on the issue of whether the alle-
ged victims of injustice have a claim to redress,
not on the issue of whether another group has
an obligation to meet the claim … even if we
are able to … establish that claimant groups
have a justified demand for compensation of
some kind, it is still necessary to investigate
whether other groups, or institutions, have a
responsibility to meet such a demand’3. That is
to say, we can leave this concern aside and still
meaningfully examine what we may collo-
quially call the ‘duties and responsibilities’ side
of the equation. A comprehensive system for
dealing with historical injustice must deal with
the concern mentioned, but Miller is concer-
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ned not with a comprehensive system but just
one part of it, that of whether groups can have
responsibilities to meet legitimate claims of
compensation. Given that this paper is a criti-
que of Miller’s account of how groups can have
inherited responsibilities, I follow Miller’s lead
here and therefore do not propose to engage
with this standard problem of thinking about
historical injustice. 
Miller’s taxonomy: three types of claims
Using a taxonomy established by Miller, let us
narrow in on three kinds of claims that victims
or the descendants of victims of past injustice
can make in the context of nations: 
‘Claims for restitution’4 – an example of this
might be Greece demanding the return of
the Elgin marbles.
‘Claims based on the idea of unjust enrich-
ment’5 – an example might be a claim made
by India today against the British, on the
grounds that Britain benefited in the past
and still benefits today from the exploitation
of India that it carried out between
(roughly) 1757 and 1947.
‘Claims based on the idea of a compensable
historic wrong’6 – the key notion here, or at
least the one I will want to concentrate on,
is that these are claims for compensation in
situations where (a) there was a historical in-
justice and (b) this historical injustice did
not benefit the perpetrators or their descen-
dants. We can refine the India-Britain case
to give an example of this. Let’s say Britain
did perpetrate injustice against India by co-
lonizing it, and by how it treated India du-
ring the period of colonization. Let’s also say,
however, and this is the diﬀerence between
the previous case and this one, that the Bri-
tish were supremely ineﬃcient exploiters,
and derived no benefit from this exploita-
tion, and that the present day members of
the British nation are therefore not unjustly
benefiting from this historical injustice per-
petrated by previous members of the British
nation.
Miller thinks that each of these three claims
can, under certain circumstances, be valid. My
argument in this paper concentrates on the
third type of claim, but before proceeding to a
consideration of it, it is necessary first to out-
line why Miller thinks these claims can be
valid.
The first two claims considered
Miller claims that nations have, or can have,
assets. These can be physical, for instance de-
posits of valuable minerals within the nation’s
territorial boundaries, or indeed the territorial
boundaries themselves, and intangible, such as
eﬀective institutions, a shared public culture,
and so on. Given that they have such assets, it
makes sense to claim, says Miller, that mem-
bers of a nation can be said to inherit at least
part of these assets from their predecessors.
Functioning institutions or a shared public cul-
ture, for instance, are things that are the result
of generations of practi-
ces and policies – they
are not created anew by
each generation. The
same can be said of
course of many physical assets – the railways,
public buildings, etc, built by Victorians, for
example, are still being used by present-day
members of the British nation. 
The claim so far is that nations can be said to
have assets, and that these assets can be said to
be inherited by succeeding members of these
nations. So far, so unexceptionable, at least for
the purposes of this paper. Having established
this claim, Miller turns his attention to the in-
dividual as a way of approaching the question
of whether responsibilities, and not just assets,
can also be inherited.
English common law and Roman law both
uphold the principle that they can, at least in
the case of individuals. For instance, it is an
established part of English common law, says
Miller, that in the case of individuals ‘those
who inherit from wrongdoers are potentially
liable to make compensation for the wrongs
committed’7. Making this potential liability ac-
tual depends on establishing that the descen-
dants of the victims ‘are themselves made worse
oﬀ by the eﬀects of the wrong’8, and an upper
limit on the compensation payable by the des-
cendants of the wrongdoers is set by the prin-
ciple ‘that inheritors should not be punished
for what their predecessors did’9, i.e. they do
not have to pay more than they inherited, even
if the harms suﬀered by the descendants of the
victims are greater than the amount of the in-
heritance.
Deriving an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ is of course a
famously fraught enterprise, but there are good
ethical grounds, thinks Miller, for why the
basic principle – that those who inherit from
wrongdoers can be liable to pay compensation
– is established in these legal systems. The ethi -
cal case for inheritance is in general flimsy,
thinks Miller, because the person inheriting has
done nothing to deserve her inheritance10. So
in a case like the following: A wrongs B, let’s
say by stealing B’s car. A dies and leaves her as-
sets to C. These assets include the car. B de-
mands that C returns the car to him. It seems
clear that B has a valid claim against C with re-
spect to wanting the car back. The situation
can be made a bit more complicated: let’s say B
dies before he makes a claim against C, but D,
who is B’s child, makes a claim for the car
against C. D has done nothing to deserve his
inheritance either, so isn’t it arbitrary whether
we give the car to B or D? Not so, thinks Mil-
ler, because ‘the right of A’s successors to inhe-
rit might seem especially questionable, since
they will in part be the beneficiaries of inju-
stice – they will be benefiting from that por-
tion of the estate which ought to have been
transferred to (B) by way of redress’11.
Let us accept then, that there are good ethical
grounds to think that in the case of individuals
it is right to say that they inherit responsibili-
ties along with assets. Given the earlier story
about nations having assets, and of members
of nations being able to inherit assets, the ana-
logy becomes clear. Claim 1 seems especially
straightforward, as it seems simply to be an in-
stance of the principle that ‘you cannot be-
queath goods to which you do not have a valid
title’12. The Elgin marbles, for instance, were
not the property of the British nation in the
first place, and therefore cannot be legitimately
handed down to future generations of Britons.
Claim 2 also seems reasonable – in the type of
circumstance in which it can obtain, the goods
in question were acquired through exploita-
tion, and it seems as illegitimate to hand down
goods that were acquired through exploitation
as through unjust acquisition. Britons do not,
then, have a valid claim to the goods that they
have received as a result of previous exploita-
tion of the Indian nation.
A critique of miller’s account in the third
type of claim
Claim type 3, however, seems more complex,
because there are no goods in question. The
present day members of the British nation have
in no way benefited from the historical inju-
stice; indeed, in my example, no members of
the British nation have ever benefited from it.
So the question of validity of title does not
seem to arise, and consequently it cannot be
used as an argument for the validity of the
claim of compensation. There is a further dis-
analogy, which is that while in the case of in-
dividuals there is an upper limit on
compensation payable for an injustice com-
mitted by the person they have inherited from,
which is set by the amount they have benefited
from the injustice in question, here there is no
such limit – the current members of the Bri-
tish nation are being asked to compensate for
an injustice from which they have not benefi-
ted in any way; it seems like they are, to use
Miller’s terminology, being punished for what
their ancestors did.
Miller clearly recognises these dis-analogies,
because he points out ‘that the liability in cases
like this is somewhat weaker than in the ear-
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lier cases where the nation that had perpetrated
the injustice also continued to benefit from
it’13. Nevertheless, he maintains that claims for
compensation in this type of situation can be
valid. His argument here is that we must think
of national inheritance in a holistic kind of
way. Present members of the British nation
have inherited a wide variety of things from
their predecessors, and at least some of these
are assets they are benefiting from. For exam-
ple, it is pretty plausible to claim that (a) they
benefit from, for example, the secure esta-
blishment of English common law, or the
roads they travel on and (b) these benefits were
secured for them in part by the eﬀorts of their
ancestors. Miller’s point now is that it is not
acceptable for the current members of the Bri-
tish nation to accept as their inheritance only
those things from which they benefit while dis-
owning those aspects of their inheritance
which are problematic, such as say the respon-
sibility to compensate India for its colonization
by previous members of the British nation. As
Miller puts it, ‘even where there is no unjust
enrichment, a nation that wants to claim the
advantages created by previous generations
must also accept a responsibility to oﬀer redress
for the injustices they inflicted’14.
This is a persuasive solution to the diﬃculty
created by the dis-analogies mentioned above,
but in my view it is also problematic. Miller’s
argument in the type of situation denoted by
the third claim is that we need to show that the
present day members of X can be treated as the
heirs of previous members of X for the purpo-
ses of redress, and then that ‘it is unjustifiable
to treat them in that way15 when what is at
stake is the inheritance of benefits, but not
when what is at stake is the inheritance of lia-
bilities’16. That is to say, if the present day
members of X benefit from at least some of the
policies, practices, etc, of their ancestors then
they cannot consistently accept these benefits
and reject the responsibilities that arise from
other policies of their predecessors – if they are
to be treated as heirs to the national inheri-
tance, then they must be so treated in all re-
spects, not just the ones which are convenient.
An important question this raises is about the
possibility of rejecting your national inheri-
tance at all, that is, the possibility of choosing
not to stand in a particular relation with re-
spect to the trans-generational community of
the nation to which you belong. I will speak
here only of the case of adults, in order to sim-
plify the discussion as much as possible.
One obvious possibility for someone who wan-
ted to reject her national inheritance compre-
hensively is emigration. Let us accept for the
moment that if you emigrate you do succeed in
comprehensively rejecting your national inhe-
ritance (I’m not sure if this is actually the case,
20
but I will explore this a bit later). Speaking ge-
nerally, I think it’s reasonable to claim that
emigration involves considerable costs. Most
obviously, there are the financial costs, which
can already be substantial, but there are also
other costs which are perhaps even more signi-
ficant. There is the cost of leaving one’s family
and friends behind. There is the cost of no lon-
ger being rooted in a particular culture and
way of life17, or at least of perhaps living in pla-
ces which do not entirely share the particular
culture you left behind. There is the cost of as-
similating into the new culture, to the extent
that this is possible. There is the cost of leaving
behind a community in which you have a
place, and a network of connections of all
kinds, for one in which you will be mostly a
stranger for at least a considerable amount of
time. One could specify more costs, but I hope
the general point is clear: emigration is in ge-
neral an extremely expensive enterprise. 
Let’s say that for some people emigration is so
expensive that it is ruled out as a possibility.
They still want to reject their national inheri-
tance, however, and they want to reject it com-
prehensively – i.e. they want neither the
benefits or the responsibilities that come with
membership in a nation. Is it possible for them
to carry out this rejection while continuing to
live within the relevant nation’s boundaries?
Let’s imagine someone who attempts to reject
his national inheritance by withdrawing from
public life completely and living like a hermit.
He goes oﬀ into the wilds, away from all mo-
dern conveniences and social interaction, sub-
sisting on berries and the like. He makes, in
short, the most dramatic eﬀort imaginable –
short of suicide – to withdraw from the bene-
fits that membership in a nation provides. 
Even in this scenario, however, it seems like he
still can be said to enjoy some benefits. Re-
member that for Miller, the national inheri-
tance consists of the benefits each generation
derives from physical assets, such as coal mines
or railways or just the national territory, for ex-
ample, and from intangible things like functio-
ning institutions, a shared public culture and
so on. The wilds he lives in, for instance, might
depend on the military apparatus of the nation
it is part of for security from external aggres-
sion. It’s kept free from highwaymen and ban-
dits because of a functioning police and the
rule of law. The berries he eats, the land he
sleeps on, the water he drinks – all of these are
part of the physical assets that make up part of
his national inheritance. It seems impossible,
then, for him, for anyone, to reject their na-
tional inheritance and the benefits flowing
from it while physically still living in that na-
tion.
There is also an argument to be made that even
emigrating does not liberate you from your na-
tional inheritance, because it doesn’t seem to
be straightforwardly the case that emigrating
means no longer benefiting from the intangible
assets that are part of the national inheritance
of the nation you emigrated from. Immigrants
who have emigrated after a certain age will
tend to benefit from the education and trai-
ning in professional and social skills that they
received in the nations they emigrated from.
Further, if you look at immigrant groups across
the world, one feature that is immediately ob-
vious in most of them is the extent to which
they attempt to preserve their old culture and
old ways of life. Immigrant groups are often
nourished and strengthened in new lands by
their emotional and intellectual attachment to
the practices of the nation or group they left
behind. In many cases it seems undeniable that
these groups are still benefiting from the in-
tangible assets handed down to them as mem-
bers of the nation they emigrated from.
Moreover, it is not clear how it would be pos-
sible for any person or group to transcend the
culture and society in which they developed to
such an extent that they could be said to have
rejected comprehensively the benefits deriving
from that culture and society. And this com-
prehensive rejection is, it seems, necessary on
Miller’s account if they are to avoid bearing re-
sponsibility for the sins of their forefathers.
As a parenthetical point: there are, of course,
diﬀerent ways in which one could be said to
own or disown one’s national identity. One
could, for instance, use the idea of national
pride as a means of getting to national respon-
sibility18. The idea might be that if one is proud
of the achievements of one’s predecessors then
one has to accept responsibility for the undesi-
rable eﬀects of those achievements; so, for ex-
ample, if a currently living Briton was proud
of the fact that Britain once had an Empire,
she would have to accept responsibility for the
undesirable eﬀects of that Empire, such as say
the exploitation of Indians. Rather than lin-
king inherited responsibility to the benefits one
receives by being a member of a nation, a link
is made between inherited responsibility and
pride in one’s national past. This makes it
much easier to own and disown one’s national
inheritance, and such a proposal would there-
fore not be open to the charge I have brought
against Miller in this section. A significant
merit of Miller’s proposal, however, when mea-
sured against this alternative, is that it elimi-
nates a crucial problem of this kind of
alternative, namely that when it is up to the in-
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dividual to decide if he or she identifies with
her past, and which aspects of it, there is a lot
of room for, as Farid Abdel-Nour puts it, “‘self-
love’ to interfere”19. 
The aim of this paper is not, however, to adju-
dicate between these two accounts, but rather
to argue that Miller’s account faces a problem.
For this reason I will not explore alternatives
to Miller’s account here, but mentioning that
they exist does bring out the important point
that I make a very limited claim in this section
of the paper, namely that Miller’s account of
inherited responsibility faces problems arising
from the diﬃculty of rejecting one’s national
inheritance (on Miller’s definition of what the
national inheritance consists of ). I do not
make the claim that these specific problems
arise for every account of inherited national re-
sponsibility.
The challenge of cultural 
cosmopolitanism?
I stated at the beginning of this paper that I
would be taking the existence of national re-
sponsibility for granted. The reason for this is
that I wanted to concentrate on Miller’s argu-
ments for inherited national responsibility,
with the emphasis on the inherited. The dis-
cussion has led us to a point, however, where it
would be as well to consider one challenge to
the idea of national responsibility, because at
first sight it is also a challenge to the idea that
it is diﬃcult or impossible to reject one’s na-
tional inheritance.
Jeremy Waldron argues in his paper ‘Minority
Cultures And The Cosmopolitan Alternative’,
that an individual’s cultural identity is not, in
the modern world, defined by allegiance to one
particular culture. Rather, it is made up of lots
of allegiances and influences from various dif-
ferent cultures, and one strong version of the
cultural cosmopolitan view would be to argue
that this is the only type of cultural identity
that is possible in the modern world. Put in
diﬀerent terms, this strong view would be that
everyone (aside from a few scattered and isola-
ted groups living in rainforests and the like) is,
culturally speaking, a world citizen, not the ci-
tizen of any specific nation, and that this is the
only citizenship that is possible. If this is true,
then it seems as though it is not only not diﬃ-
cult or not impossible to reject one’s national
inheritance, it is actually impossible not to.
Miller would not concede this view was cor-
rect, but even if it was, it seems possible to
adapt his argument for inherited responsibility
to take the stipulated correctness of strong cul-
tural cosmopolitanism into account. Remem-
ber that for Miller, it is standing in a particular
relation to the transgenerational community,
that of being heirs to previous generations, that
justifies being held responsible for the trans-
gressions of previous generations. The cultural
cosmopolitan does not deny that culture sha-
pes and benefits individuals, she just denies
that this culture is a specific one. Now, even if
the strong view is right, what follows is not that
individuals do not stand in this relation to any
previous generation, rather, that they stand in
a particular relation – by virtue of inheriting
culture – not the transgenerational national
community, but rather the international one.
Miller’s arguments therefore can, I think, with
some work and modifications, essentially be
transposed to the international realm. Indeed,
it seems at first sight as
though this transposition
will immensely widen the
range of inherited respon-
sibilities we have. The
challenge from cultural
cosmopolitanism might,
in other words, lead to a rejection of a national
inheritance and responsibility, but it is not ne-
cessarily a rejection of Miller’s arguments for
inherited responsibility.
Further, and more importantly, the relevant
point for the purposes of this paper is the diﬃ-
culty of rejecting one’s (national) inheritance.
Suppose we grant that there is no such thing
as a national inheritance, it still remains true
that rejecting one’s international cultural inhe-
ritance is extremely diﬃcult. Indeed, given the
wider range of the inheritance, it is diﬃcult to
see how one could escape inheriting it – one
has to inherit something, after all, when it
comes to cultural resources, whether it be
language, philosophical beliefs, religious com-
mitments, etc. The central point, therefore, I
think still stands: it is either extremely expen-
sive or flat out impossible to reject one’s inhe-
ritance, be it national or international.
Finally, my view, which I will not go into at
length here, is that the strong version of cultu-
ral cosmopolitanism is implausible. There is
certainly an important insight that cultural
cosmopolitanism points to, namely that we in-
herit intangible assets from several diﬀerent
places. ‘Hamlet’, or the Pieta of Michelangelo,
for instance, are part of the cultural inheritance
of people from across the world, not just Bri-
tons or Italians, while the teachings of the
Buddha, and the long culture of tradition and
practice of Buddhism, are not the sole inheri-
tance of current members of the Indian nation;
indeed, modern-day India is largely non-
Buddhist. But we can acknowledge this wit-
hout having to deny the importance of a
particular cultural identity, or the importance
of national ties. Such a denial would, I claim,
run contrary to the experience of most of the
people in this world, and is therefore not plau-
sible.
Considering one response to the critique of
Miller 
But in any case, it appears to me that we can
leave the two last questions open: that is, the
question of whether emigration can amount to
a rejection of one’s national inheritance, and
the question of whether cultural cosmopolita-
nism is correct. Even if the answers to both
these questions are positive, I think that the na-
ture of my criticism is clear, and that it is still
forceful. Rejecting one’s national inheritance20
is, when it is not impossible, generally extre-
mely costly. Given this impossibility/costliness,
it is not clear that one can demand of mem-
bers of a nation that they have to bear these
costs if they want to avoid the responsibilities
of compensating for injustices perpetrated by
their predecessors as members of that nation. 
The costliness or impossibility of rejecting one’s
national inheritance speaks against the possi-
bility of rejecting it. It does not seem to make
sense, given how Miller characterises the na-
tional inheritance and how I have characterised
the costs of rejecting it, to talk of accepting or
rejecting it; how is one to go about, for exam-
ple, ‘rejecting’ that air has oxygen in it, or that
we need oxygen to survive?
There might, however, be a diﬀerent sense in
which one can accept or reject one’s national
inheritance. Indeed, Miller seems to point to
it when he writes that one has to consistently
‘own’ or ‘disown’ the policies of previous gene-
rations. This sense deals with reasons; in the
context of national inheritance, what it might
mean is the following. Let’s grant that it is im-
possible or unreasonably costly to escape from
one’s national inheritance in the sense I have
been talking about so far, i.e. in the sense of no
longer benefiting from at least some of the
things it comprises. We can, however, still
choose whether we are happy with accepting it
or not. That is to say, even if I cannot avoid be-
nefiting from the national inheritance associa-
ted with being Indian, I can choose to regret
this or be accepting of it. If I decide to accept
it, perhaps am even proud of it, I can be said to
have accepted my national inheritance; and
then the claim would be that if I have accepted
my national inheritance in this way I become
liable to respond to claims for compensation
made by people or groups who had injustice
perpetrated against them by my predecessors.
This might not be unproblematic. For exam-
ple, a German person could have said in 1960
that she regretted benefiting from the national
Intergenerational Justice Review
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inheritance, and on this account she has dis-
owned the policies of her predecessors. A con-
sequence of the view outlined in the previous
paragraph is that this somehow lets her oﬀ the
hook, that she therefore does not have an ob-
ligation to respond to claims for compensation
made, for example, by the state of Israel. This
consequence seems unacceptable, at least to
me, because the view doesn’t seem to capture
one of our important intuitions about respon-
sibility, namely that it can be the case that it
doesn’t matter what we accept or regret or
choose, we can still be held responsible. This is
a point that has been made several times in the
context of individuals. I may not choose, for
example, the circumstance of being by a pond
while a child is drowning in it, but I can still be
held responsible for not attempting to save
her21. 
These considerations have led us to two im-
portant and conflicting intuitions about re-
sponsibility. The first is the intuition that free
agency, or free rational choice, is an essential
component of any account of responsibility,
the second is the idea that, to quote Miller, ‘my
responsibilities are thrust on me by my cir-
cumstances, but they do not cease to be my re-
sponsibilities because of that’22.
To sum up the discussion so far, I think Miller’s
argument for historical responsibility in the
third type of case leads to a predicament. To
put the point in Miller’s terms, on one plausi-
ble reading of what it means to accept one’s na-
tional inheritance, it does not seem to make
sense to say that members of a nation want to
claim their national inheritance (which it must
do if it is to be held responsible for various in-
justices committed by is predecessors) – they
just have it, and therefore it does not seem to
be plausible to base an account of the legiti-
macy of historical responsibility on the idea
that one can choose to claim one’s national in-
heritance in its totality (i.e. that in choosing to
claim the benefits one also chooses to claim the
responsibilities). So we move to the other rea-
ding, the sense in which claiming one’s natio-
nal inheritance involves something like having
independent persuasive reasons to accept it or
aﬃrming that one doesn’t regret having it, but
then the problem is that on this reading we
seem to stray too far from the intuition that it
doesn’t even matter if one wants to claim it or
not, one can still be held responsible for it23.
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Conclusion
This paper has been focused on David Miller’s
account of historical responsibility, and even
more specifically, on his account of historic re-
sponsibility in one specific type of situation.
This is the situation characterised by what Mil-
ler describes as ‘claims based on the idea of a
compensable historic wrong’24; cases, that is,
where ‘acts of injustice occurred which harmed
their victims in one way or other (without ne-
cessarily benefiting the perpetrators or their
descendants), and which can be compensated
for, at least in part, by money payments or
other forms of material compensation either to
the victims themselves or their descendants’25.
I further sharpened this case, by considering a
hypothetical situation such as the one above
but with the further stipulation that it was one
in which the perpetrators and their descen-
dants did not benefit from the acts of injustice.
Finally, I also stipulated, for obvious reasons,
that in the type of case I was considering we
would be talking about the descendants of the
victims and the perpetrators. 
As I have outlined earlier, Miller argues that
claims for compensation can be valid in this
type of case, because ‘even where there is no
unjust enrichment, a nation that
wants to claim the advantages crea-
ted by previous generations must also
accept a responsibility to oﬀer redress
for the injustices they aﬀected’26.
More generally speaking, the idea is
that if you want to claim the natio-
nal inheritance, you have to claim all of it.
I have tried to argue in this paper that this ac-
count of historical responsibility runs into eit-
her the problem of making it intelligible that a
nation can be said to ‘accept’ its national inhe-
ritance, or of doing violence to our intuition
that in some circumstances it doesn’t matter in
terms of responsibility whether we have accep-
ted them (i.e. our circumstances) or not. Con-
sequently, my claim is that Miller’s account is,
as it stands, unsuccessful in justifying the exi-
stence of historical responsibility in the speci-
fic type of situation I have picked out. 
Notes:
∗ I would like to thank four anonymous reviewers and
David Miller for their comments. I would also like to ex-
tend special thanks to Nora Kreft and Lukas Meyer.
(1) This would be an ingenious explanation of the centuries
of sexist discrimination that the descendants of Eve have
subsequently suﬀered.
(2) Waldron 1993: 4-28; Waldron 2002: 135-160 and Sher
1997.
(3) Miller 2008: 137.
(4) Ibid: 138.
(5) Ibid.
(6) Ibid. 
(7) Ibid: 150.
(8) Ibid.
(9) Ibid.
(10) Ibid: 151.
(11) Ibid: 150.
(12) Ibid: 152.
(13) Ibid: 155-156.
(14) Ibid.
(15) I.e. as heirs.
(16) Miller 2008: 156.
(17) I recognise that this is sometimes a benefit of, and even
a reason for, emigration. But it would be wrong to not si-
multaneously recognise that it is also often a serious cost.
(18) A view of this kind can be found in Abdel-Nour 2003:
693-719. I thank an anonymous reviewer for alerting me to
this.
(19) Abdel-Nour 2003: 710.
(20) I will continue to write ‘national’ inheritance for the
sake of convenience, and terminological coherence with the
earlier part of this paper.
(21) It has also been made about groups, for example by
Held 1991.
(22) Miller 2008: 121. Miller makes this claim in his dis-
cussion of national responsibility, where he rejects the claim
that as people have not chosen to be in their historical si-
tuation they cannot be held responsible for things deriving
from it. However, he seems to make the opposite claim in his
discussion on the historical responsibility immigrant groups
might have, where he rejects the analogy between an immi-
grant entering a nation and an individual joining a business
partnership, on the grounds that often immigration is not a
matter of choice, and further that at any rate the descen-
dants of immigrants cannot be said to have given their con-
sent to joining the nation. It seems here he is trading on the
intuition about the importance of free consent to an account
of responsibility, while earlier he rejects its significance.
(23) This diﬃculty has been brought out for the type of
claim that takes place where no one has unjustly benefited,
but I think it can be extended to any benefit-based argu-
ment for historical responsibility.
(24) Miller 2008: 139.
(25) Miller 2008: 139.
(26) Miller 2008: 155-156.
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nation and human to human, but also human to other
forms of life.
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bstract: Claims of indigenous minori-
ties to land are a significant political
issue in many parts of the world. These
claims, though, are contested, be it in theoretical,
political or legal terms. I consider a position, put
forward by Jeremy Waldron, that asserts some
theoretical reservations towards indigenous mi-
norities' claims to reparations and land. Waldron
seems to assume that indigeneity is no important
factor regarding land claims and reparative issues.
I propose a rivalling account of indigenous land
claims, based on the idea of self-determination.
Self-determination itself can be understood in two
diﬀerent ways, it can either be conceived as a form
of political autonomy or sovereignty, or it can be
understood as having pre-political property
rights.*
Introduction
Political issues regarding indigenous or natio-
nal minorities are arguably amongst the most
burning ethno-political concerns throughout
the world. The history of slavery, colonialism
and imperialism, the emergence of nation
states and power politics had fatal consequen-
ces for many cultural groups in every part of
the world. As Lars-Anders Baer, president of
the Saami parliament in Sweden, indicates in-
digenous minorities have for a long time been
“the wretched of the earth”1 when it came to
ethno-cultural or economic justice. Things
may have changed, at least to some degree, du-
ring the last years.2 In international law at least
indigenous minorities have, after decades of
struggle, gained recognition and a juridical
basis to make their interests heard.3
Issues regarding indigenous minorities, apart
from concrete legal and political considerati-
ons, also raise interesting philosophical questi-
ons. In this essay, I would like to scrutinise one
of them. I will, most generally, be interested in
indigenous minorities' claims to land, i.e.
claims to their traditional territory of settle-
ment. Through the history of colonialism and
imperialism, diﬀerent groups that we today
refer to as indigenous peoples, aborigines, first
nations etc, lost their traditional homelands to
the new settlers. Throughout the world—or at
least where the interests of indigenous minori-
ties are not completely denied or ignored—
claims to regain rights to this land seem to be
at the heart of indigenous peoples' political
struggles.
One of the main aims of this essay is to scruti-
nise what is at stake when we speak about in-
digenous land claims.
Put diﬀerently, the
main question is: how
should we understand
indigenous claims to
land? In a first step, I
will sketch a recently
presented position by Jeremy Waldron that
takes indigenous land claims to be fundamen-
tally problematic. They are, Waldron holds,
confronted with some grave theoretical flaws.
In a second step, I will then outline an alter-
native account on indigenous land claims,
drawing on the axiomatic idea of self-determi-
nation. I will thus outline a possible under-
standing of indigenous land claims on other
grounds than the ones presented by Waldron.
Thus, I will propose a possible interpretation
of what rationale might underlie indigenous
land claims. I argue that by claiming land,
what is actually aspired is self-determination in
the broadest sense. Self-determination itself
can be understood in two diﬀerent ways, it can
either be conceived as a form of political auto-
nomy or sovereignty, or it can be understood as
having pre-political property rights. Self-de-
termination in the first sense means amplified
political influence, self-government and auto-
nomy. Ownership over a certain piece of land
does not convey any such political recognition.
It just includes rights to use, management etc.
Thus in its second sense, self-determination is
reached by pre- or extra-political ownership
rights in the land. In my definition, political
rights can be granted independent of owner-
ship rights, just as ownership rights can be
granted independent of any political rights. We
can, now, interpret some indigenous land
claims as claims to the ownership of land.
Ownership of the claimed land might confer
self-determination independent of any political
status.4
This interpretation, then, might also be im-
portant in more general discussions on repara-
tive justice—not just regarding land claims.
The account presented might help to under-
stand what the (political and economic) inju-
stice committed against indigenous peoples
consisted in.
How to understand indigenous land claims?
One point of access to the understanding of
Indigenous minorities' claims to land
by Daniel Weyermann
A
Land: A part of the earth's surface, considered as property. 
The theory that land is property subject to private ownership and
control is the foundation of modern society, and is eminently
worthy of the superstructure. 
/ Ambrose Bierce /
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